| International relations scholars generally consider institutional design to be a bastion of state domination. The extent to which an intergovernmental organization (IGO) is insulated from mechanisms of state control is a pivotal organizational characteristic, and the design process constitutes a key occasion in which states attempt to install mechanisms (e.g., veto power or budget control) by which to steer, monitor, or reverse the activities of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) well into the future. However, two-thirds of today's IGOs were created not by states alone, but with the involvement of international bureaucrats working in pre-existing intergovernmental organizations. This prompts fundamental questions. What accounts for variation in the roles that international bureaucrats play in institutional design? And what impact does their involvement have on the designs emerging from negotiations?;Bridging rationalist and constructivist scholarship, I construct a theoretical framework to address both questions. First, I argue that institutional design agenda-setting by international bureaucrats increases with their capacity, their own insulation from state control, and their alliances vis-a-vis states. Second, I argue that the more extensively international bureaucrats set the institutional design agenda, the better able they are to present states with a fait accompli that advances their own objectives by loosening mechanisms of state control -- in terms of resource management, institutional oversight, and decision-making practices -- in new bodies within their organizational family.;A complementary approach of statistical analyses and in-depth case studies test these predictions. In pursuit of generalizable findings, I have constructed a new and original dataset ofthe origins of randomly selected IGOs. To enhance understanding of some of the most prominent organizations in the world, I also process-trace the origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), International Energy Agency (IEA), Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and World Food Program (WFP). My predictions about international bureaucrats in the institutional design arena hold, even after accounting for state-based factors also shaping their role and impact. Institutional design is an arena in which international bureaucrats have a tangible effect, by shaping mechanisms by which states endeavor to control new bodies. The theoretical and policy implications of this touch on principal-agent relationships, delegation chains, and ongoing debates about bureaucratic independence and democratic deficits in the international realm. |
