| This paper investigates whether managers that have a propensity for personal tax aggressiveness are associated with tax avoidance at the firm level. Motivated by Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman (2009) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009), I construct a measure of personally tax aggressive ("aggressive") managers and determine whether corporate tax avoidance activities increase in their presence. The results of my study indicate that aggressive managers are associated with firm-level tax avoidance. The neoclassical view would suggest that aggressive managers' tax expertise could benefit shareholders through lower tax payments. Since aggressive managers extract their personal tax savings from shareholders, non-tax agency costs potentially increase in their presence. This has implications for the association between aggressive managers and firm value. Using the framework established through the agency view of tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008) I find that on average the presence of aggressive managers is associated with increased firm value. However, consistent with recent research, governance is an important moderating factor whereby firm value in the presence of aggressive managers tends to increase only for relatively better-governed firms. |
