Political regime, business coordination, unity of rural farmers, and agricultural politics in developing countries: A case study of Thailand

Agriculture is the most important economic sector in developing countries. Agricultural exports are the major source of developing countries' incomes; moreover, the majority of citizens are employed in agriculture. Agricultural policies in developing countries have been shifting for more than two decades. Governments in several developing countries have increasingly reduced taxes on agricultural commodities and provided agricultural assistance for rural farmers. Nonetheless, variation in agricultural policies has persisted in that the government has largely subsidized particular agricultural sectors at the expense of others. This dissertation examines the shift and variation of agricultural policies in developing countries and Thailand, in particular. It seeks to explain what factors result in shift of agricultural policies from discriminating against agriculture to subsidizing the sector and variation of the state's policies in agricultural sectors.;The argument promoted in this dissertation is that democratic governments are likely to reduce taxes on agricultural commodities, whereas authoritarian governments are likely to impose taxes on the commodities. Moreover, the author argues that the government is likely to reduce taxes on agricultural sectors and transfer public revenue to the sectors, when agricultural businesses are highly coordinated and rural farmers are highly united. Using cross-country and case study (Thailand's rice sector) analyses, the dissertation shows that democratic governments in developing countries are likely to reduce taxes on agricultural tradable commodities, which were heavily taxed by the governments. In contrast, authoritarian governments are likely to impose high taxes on the commodities. Empirical results from a case study of Thailand's rice and sugar sectors show that the state is likely to provide positive tax environment for agricultural sectors, when agricultural businesses are able to coordinate or collaborate with each other. In contrast, despite rural farmers' attempt to unite and mobilize, they do not have an impact on agricultural policies. The dissertation implies that democratic governments are more likely to be responsive to the demand of rural farmers (who make up the majority of people) than their authoritarian counterparts. It implies that organized agricultural interests are able to influence agricultural policies, whereas rural farmers struggle to influence agricultural policies.