Macroprotection: The Causes and Consequences of Temporal Variation in Mass Trade Preference

Public support for trade openness varies over time. This temporal variation in mass trade preferences is substantial, occurs over relatively short periods of time, and is not anticipated by our existing theories of public opinion and trade policy. I document this variation, develop a theory to explain it, and show that it has politically and economically important effects on the level of protection that policy makers supply to import-competing industries. In the first half of the project, I argue that support for trade openness varies over time as a result of changes in the relative salience of the cross-cutting effects of trade liberalization: access to a wider variety of less costly consumer goods and the displacement of workers as a result of increased competition from abroad. I test this argument using observational and experimental survey data at the individual and aggregate levels.;In the second half of the project, I argue that this variation in public opinion shapes the context in which policy makers and import-competing interests bargain over trade policy. When the public is relatively more sympathetic to protectionist interests, protection is less costly for policy makers to supply and for import-competing interests to secure. I test this argument using data on temporary trade barriers in the U.S. since the creation of the World Trade Organization. I show that firms seeking temporary trade protection are more likely to secure it when the public is broadly skeptical of trade openness and that trade barriers approved in these protectionist moments are more likely to be challenged at the WTO than those approved when the public is less protectionist. This implies that policy makers are more willing to risk violating standing international trade policy commitments in the presence of a sympathetic audience. Together, these findings suggest that the public plays a more important and dynamic role in the political economy of trade policy than is generally appreciated.