Three essays on trade negotiations in the WTO

The dissertation has three essays. The first essay studies the efficiency of the renegotiation process in the WTO when there is private information. The study considers a game that Home or Foreign has private information. In both cases, the study finds that the renegotiation process cannot attain both politically optimal tariffs and pareto-efficient tariffs regardless a number of instruments. The renegotiation can yield politically optimal tariffs when international transfers between the two countries are allowed.; The second essay considers whether the principle of reciprocity benefits developing countries. To analyze this, developing countries are categorized in two groups: (i) big countries with lower bargaining power, and (ii) small countries, with bad threat points. This paper compares the welfare outcomes of developing countries under four tariff bargaining methods: (i) sequential bargaining without MFN, (ii) sequential bargaining with MFN, (iii) sequential bargaining with MFN and reciprocity, and (iv) sequential bargaining with the Enabling Clause. The study finds that reciprocity benefits developing countries if they have lower bargaining power; on the other hand, reciprocity hurts those countries when they are small. Finally, the Enabling Clause benefits developing countries only when they are small.; In the last essay, we study the effect of the GSP program on the welfares of small countries. The study considers the case that there is political pressure on the producer's side of small countries. The paper compares the welfares of small countries under the sequential tariff bargaining game when MFN is imposed with the sequential bargaining game when GSP is granted. The study finds that small countries benefit from the GSP program when the political pressure is low. Otherwise, they are indifferent between MFN tariffs and the GSP program. Also, the GSP granting country gains from the GSP program and the total welfare improves. Finally, the study finds that sequential tariff bargaining cannot attain efficient tariffs even when GSP is granted.