| The dissertation consists of six independent papers dealing with practical reason and practical rationality. In the first two papers, I defend a version of internalism about practical reason against challenges from John McDowell (I) and Christine Korsgaard (II). In the next two papers, I consider the structure of instrumental rationality---that is, how we should formulate the rational requirement to intend the necessary means to our ends. I argue that our ends do not provide reasons to take the necessary means (III) and defend, against some recent challenges, the view that instrumental rationality involves a specific kind of "wide-scope ought" of the form "you ought (if you intend the end, intend the necessary means)" (IV). In the final two papers, I consider the normativity of instrumental rationality---that is, why we are rationally bound to intend the necessary means to our ends. I argue that we cannot explain this by appealing to theoretical rationality or logical constraints on intentions (V) nor by appealing to Carroll's paradox concerning modus ponens (VI). |
