The role of sympathy and empathy in moral judgment; with special reference to David Hume and Adam Smith

In public discourse about morality, it has become a truism that "sympathy" and/or "empathy" is necessary (and sometimes sufficient) for someone to develop into a moral being. This truism is problematic in two ways: (1) the terms are not as clearly defined as everyone presumes them to be; and (2) as a result, it is not always clear what role the phenomena, denoted by "sympathy" and/or "empathy," are meant to (and are able to) play in our moral judgments. The first chapter outlines the major groups of phenomena that are associated with the terms in order to more carefully consider the role of "sympathy" and/or "empathy" in moral judgment.; In order to explore the utmost limits of their role in moral judgment, the dissertation proceeds by focusing on theories that make "sympathy" the root of moral judgment. Thus, David Hume's and Adam Smith's notions of "sympathy" are considered---along with the problems that must be overcome in order for "sympathy" to serve as the foundation of moral judgment in each system. In both philosophers, "sympathy" is corrected by an impartial point of view. However, modern "sympathy"-based theories are uncomfortable with the notion of "impartiality." The Ethics of Care is an example of this and is studied to see how it fares without "impartiality." It becomes clear that "sympathy" and/or "empathy" can play a role in moral judgment only if we make certain unproven assumptions about human nature. These assumptions also carry with them certain metaethical implications that not every moral philosopher would be willing to accept.; In the end, it is shown that everyone must accept a modest role for these phenomena---as they are necessary for at least one subset of moral judgments, those dependent on our beliefs about the mental states of others---and everyone must accept the implications for moral judgment. Any role beyond that mentioned cannot be proven at this time (and would in fact be resisted by those who are uncomfortable with naturalism or relativism). However, the nature of the mechanism of "sympathy" and/or "empathy" may require a larger role for these phenomena in moral judgment in order to do a good job in their more modest role.