| There is an ongoing debate in Reid scholarship over whether, and to what extent, Reid's response to skepticism is buttressed by an appeal to a benevolent God. I use the label "epistemological providentialism" to describe an epistemology that includes such an appeal in a fundamental way. A flaw shared by all of the previous discussions of Reid's epistemological providentialism is insufficient grounding in Reid's own texts. My own entry in this debate attempts to rectify this problem. Unlike many of those involved in the debate over Reid's providentialism, however, I am only interested in whether Reid holds such a view, not in an evaluation of his epistemology. Thus, my aim is purely exegetical.;This study has two main parts. First, I examine the previous arguments made on both sides of the debate. Each of these turns out to be lacking in one way or another, so none is sufficient to decide the question of whether Reid is an epistemological providentialist. I then turn my attention to Reid's own case against skepticism, breaking that case into two parts. The first part consists of an examination of four arguments made by Reid: first, briefly, his argument against the theory of ideas, and then his arguments that skepticism is a practical impossibility, that the skeptic has all of the burden of proof, and that the skeptic shows undue partiality towards reason over information from the senses. All four of these arguments are made at the level of belief rather than knowledge, and all but the first show some evidence of epistemological providentialism. However, the providentialism found here is only of a mild variety. The second part of my examination of Reid's case against skepticism turns to the account of knowledge he uses to supplement his account of belief. I conclude that Reid puts forth a view of knowledge as confirmed true belief, and that, for Reid, the confirmation of our beliefs depends on an appeal to a benevolent God. Thus, the analysis of this critical aspect of Reid's epistemology does indeed show that Reid is an epistemological providentialist. |
