| Scholars of international relations have long considered that states become more likely to use some form of military coercion, be it the use of force or the explicit or implicit threat to use force, as they get stronger relative to their adversaries.;The dissertation challenges this widely-accepted view of power politics.;I argue that stronger states are, in fact, unlikely to influence weaker states with any form of military coercion. By definition, strong states are rich in material resources, while weak states are poor. Hence, stronger states can buy off weaker states with side-payments, which lowers their need to use military force. Since war is costly and stronger states can get what they want even without using force (through side-payments), they are unlikely to be able to credibly commit themselves to using force. As a result of this commitment problem for stronger states, they should be unlikely to influence weaker states with any form of military coercion, be it the use of force or the explicit or implicit threat to use force.;Using the data on military disputes and international crises, the dissertation presents empirical evidence supporting my argument. Specifically, I find that increases in states' relative power initially make them more likely to use military coercion, but further increases in their relative power make them less likely to do so. This non-monotonicity implies a security dilemma for weaker states---i.e., the security of weaker states decreases with their relative power. Power and security do not always go together. |
