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Cognitive bias and democracy: A behavioral approach to normative democratic theory

Posted on:2008-09-15Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:Boston UniversityCandidate:Kelly, Jamie TerenceFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390005980420Subject:Philosophy
Abstract/Summary:
In my dissertation I argue for adopting a behavioral approach to normative democratic theory. Following behavioral law and behavioral economics, I argue for rejecting the rational actor model of human decision making and replacing it with a picture of choice imported from empirical psychology and social science. My empirical focus is the phenomenon of framing effects (a framing effect occurs when different but equivalent presentations of a decision problem elicit different judgments or preferences) and its significance for theories of democracy.; In Chapter One, I introduce research on framing and explain why it should lead us to abandon the rational choice principle of invariance (invariance requires that decisions be invariant across equivalent formulations of the same problem) within normative democratic theory.; In Chapter Two, I discuss the various theories of democracy that currently comprise democratic theory. I propose a taxonomy of democratic theories that ranks them (from minimalist to epistemic) in accordance with the degree of reliability that they demand from the judgment of citizens.; In Chapter Three, I show that adopting a behavioral approach to democratic theory allows us to focus on three important theoretical concerns: (i) moral reasons for endorsing democracy, (ii) feasibility considerations governing particular theories, and (iii) implications for institutional design.; In Chapter Four, I argue that the behavioral approach developed here shows two things: (i) minimalist theories of democracy can generate only relatively weak moral reasons for endorsing democracy, and (ii) epistemic theories of democracy must endorse institutional mechanisms capable of bolstering citizen judgment.; In Chapter Five, I discuss institutional mechanisms aimed at counteracting the effects of framing. I argue that plausible theories of democracy will endorse some of the following mechanisms: (i) proposals to increase the amount of political speech (e.g.: media reform and multi-party systems), (ii) mechanisms designed to insulate democratic outcomes from flawed decision-making (e.g.: judicial and risk review), and (iii) programs of public education.; I conclude by pointing out the promise of a broader application of the behavioral approach (one that is not restricted to an evaluation of framing effects) for normative democratic theory.
Keywords/Search Tags:Democratic theory, Behavioral approach, Democracy, Framing, Argue
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