| This project examines how governments develop preferences for dispute resolution institutions. The intuitive explanation for the form of dispute resolution is that powerful states avoid strong dispute resolution systems and while weaker states prefer such systems. The logic is that powerful states are advantaged in the default system of party-to-party negotiations and that are loathe to relinquish this advantage. Even if the powerful states were able to negotiate a favorable agreement, they want to maintain the unilateral right to interpret the agreement and will resist delegations to an independent body.; Yet lawmaking at the international level, whether through negotiated agreements or court decisions, can substitute for lawmaking at the national level. The demand for international rules will be, in part, dependent on the government's political system. We can only discern the advantages and disadvantages of making rules at the international level if we know the structure of domestic decision-making.; Preferences for dispute resolution design are derived from domestic and international politics. Changes in the international process produce changes in the domestic politics of trade policy. Dispute resolution institutions shape the political context of trade issues at the international and domestic levels. In addition to affecting substantive policy, international institutions influence the nature of decision-making power within the domestic governance system by shifting policy-making power between different national-level actors. |
