The Korean paradox of the 1972 Sino-American rapprochement: An East Asian perspective

According to conventional wisdom, the Sino-American rapprochement, the Shanghai communique of February 1972, is a historic watershed of detente during the Cold War. This event facilitated another historic event in the Korean peninsula, the July Fourth Joint Communique, which is regarded as the first step toward an inter-Korean detente. The conventional view analyzes the Shanghai communique between the United States of America (U.S.) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on one hand, and the July Fourth Joint Communique between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the other hand at the systemic level. The upper structure between the guardian states---the U.S. and the PRC---reduced the tension in the lower structure between the ward states---the ROK and the DPRK---resulting in the first inter-Korean detente in July 1972.; However, this conventional systemic approach ignores the dynamics of bilateral relations between the two Koreas, and between the U.S. and the PRC, as well as between the ROK and the U.S. and between the DPRK and the PRC. This dissertation analyzes this dynamics of international relations in Northeast Asia. This study proves that Seoul and Pyongyang viewed the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing as a threat to their security, and that there were conflicts between the two Koreas and their respective guardian states, the U.S. and the PRC. Seoul and Pyongyang concluded the 1972 inter-Korean detente and issued the July Fourth Joint Communique despite their mutual hostility and distrust. The two Koreas concluded an unwelcome detente in 1972 because of the pressures from the U.S. and the PRC and the fear of abandonment by them.