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Administrative appeals in the federal district courts: Judicial decision making in social security disability cases

Posted on:2013-12-20Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of HoustonCandidate:Sennewald, Marc AFull Text:PDF
GTID:1456390008485699Subject:Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The social security disability insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs are important parts of the social safety net. Looming insolvency in the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, however, has drawn attention to the implementation of these vital programs.;This dissertation explores the decision making behavior of federal district court judges in social security disability appeals. Social security disability appeals are appeals from determinations, by the Social Security Administration, that applicants for disability insurance benefits and/or Supplemental Security Income benefits are not disabled and therefore not eligible to receive such benefits.;Using binomial and multinomial logistic regression, this analysis of over 4000 disability decisions made by district court judges between 1957 and 2008 demonstrates that both ideology and geography have a sizable impact on the decisions that judges make.;Political ideology, measured by political party affiliation of the judge, political party affiliation of the appointing president, and scaled ideology scores, has a substantial effect on case outcomes. Judges identified as Republicans or conservatives are 1.5 to 1.7 times more likely to affirm a denial of benefits by the Social Security Administration than judges identified as Democrats or liberals.;The analysis also demonstrates that regional affiliation, judicial circuit, and the percentage of a state's working age population that receive disability benefits all influence disability decisions. The effect of state disability population, in particular, suggests that disability determination is influenced by the federalist design of the disability determination system. Federal judges appear to play a moderating role. The data indicate that judges located in states where state officials apply the disability rules relatively loosely are significantly more likely to rule against disability claimants than judges in states where state officials apply the disability rules strictly.;The evidence presented in this dissertation also suggests that male judges are more activist than female judges in disability cases, that African-American judges show more judicial restraint than non-African-American judges, and that overall judges show more activism when the Social Security Administration initiates proceedings to terminate benefits.
Keywords/Search Tags:Social security, Disability, Judges, Benefits, Appeals, District, Judicial, Federal
PDF Full Text Request
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