Fighting over peace: Spoilers, peace agreements, and the strategic use of violence

Who "spoils" peace agreements and how threatening are these acts of spoiling? This study addresses these two underlying international security concerns. It does so by first developing an accurate definition of spoilers: those actors who use violence or threats of violence in an overt attempt to undermine a signed civil war peace agreement, modify its provisions, or alter its implementation. This definition overcomes existing limitations in the literature by emphasizing the strategic nature of violence used to influence peace agreements, and by incorporating a wide range of actors with multiple goals that go beyond terminating the agreement. By creating an original dataset of violence following 241 civil war peace agreements in the post-Cold War era, this study then analyzes spoiling and spoilers. It introduces a new "three-pronged interaction approach" that examines the incentives, objectives, and capabilities of spoilers. This analysis contributes to a new understanding of spoiling occurrence. Specifically, spoiling is primarily motivated by cost-benefit calculations on the part of actors in the conflict, and occurs where peace agreements have the greatest political ramifications. Inside spoiling is driven by an imbalance of power between the government and rebel signatories, with rebels turning to spoiling to increase their bargaining position. Outside spoiling is more likely when powerful actors are excluded from the peace agreement. This study further explores the effects of spoiling, concluding that spoiling rarely poses a danger to peace. Most spoilers are too weak to derail the peace agreement, and are not usually attempting to terminate it. In many cases, spoiling actually helps to strengthen peace agreements. Spoiling, however, does pose a threat to peace agreements when it is undertaken by powerful actors, notably paramilitaries and state security forces, excluded from the agreement. The study thus contributes a new "bypass" theory of spoiling that conceptualizes this behavior primarily as a bargaining tool when other avenues for affecting the peace agreement are blocked or prove ineffective. Finally, this study develops a model for policymakers that advocates anticipation of spoilers, an approach of sufficient inclusion to peace agreements, continued negotiations after agreements are signed, and the incorporation of third-party oversight.