Patent rights and patent infringement remedies: Working toward a unified theory

This dissertation presents a framework for defining legal rights and remedies in connection with patents in a manner that approaches economic efficiency. Previous writers have considered ways in which patent rights might be designed to further goals of economic efficiency, but infringement remedies have not been considered explicitly as an economically important dimension of such rights in connection with the efficient production and use of information and inventions.; In other areas of law and economics dealing with private incentives, the analysis of rights and remedies arises out of a common theoretical foundation. With respect to patents, however, efficiency has been discussed primarily in terms of the optimal duration and breadth of patents. Discussion of remedies for patent infringement has proceeded along separate lines.; This dissertation examines existing legal and economics literature relating to patents, including judicial opinions, to demonstrate that existing theory is incapable of yielding policy recommendations that are genuinely useful in achieving economic efficiency. A new model is presented that unifies analysis of patent rights and patent infringement remedies. The model strongly suggests that infringement remedies may be considerably more useful and important in fashioning a socially desirable patent regime (at least from the standpoint of economic efficiency) than other aspects of patent rights, such as varying the scope or duration of legal protection for inventions.