International Structure, Cooperation, and Sovereign Debt Crises: The Brazilian Debt Restructurings of 1898, 1931, and 1983

In this dissertation, I offer three main contributions to the literature on sovereign debt. First, I make the case for a structurally-oriented perspective on debt crises. The social institutions that comprise the finance and production structures of the international economy act as conduits for the transmission of crises from developed countries to the periphery of the system, as they increase the relative scarcity of capital through mechanisms such as capital and trade flows. I argue that defaults and moratoria are thus better understood as reactions to the relative scarcity of capital at the international level and not as opportunistic strategies adopted by utility-maximizing politicians who want to avoid the costs associated with repayment. Second, I reevaluate the relationship between debtors and creditors and how they cooperate. I argue that they cooperate by means of positive-sum debt restructuring processes whose results fall within a continuum between full repayment and full repudiation. In other words, cooperation is based on a compromise and not on the enforcement of the original terms of debt contracts by creditor countries or the creditors themselves. Finally, I offer a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the role that the structural power of creditors and creditor countries play in the sovereign debt market, and I argue that they shape the social arrangements that regulate their relationship with debtor countries. I support my claims with qualitative historical studies of three past cases of Brazilian moratoria and debt renegotiations -- the Funding Loans of 1898 and 1931, and the Financing Program for 1983.