| My dissertation examines the performance consequences of firm scope choices. These encompass both vertical scope choices (i.e., vertical integration) as well as horizontal scope choices (i.e., corporate diversification). In the first chapter of my dissertation, I explore the effect of vertical integration on product development outcomes. In the context of the motion picture industry, I analyze how vertical integration between producers and distributors affect the commercial performance of new products. I find that vertical integration significantly increases the commercial performance of new products and that this effect is completely mediated by downstream investments in specialized complementary resources. In the process, I also explore how uncertain access to specialized complementary assets can create market failures in the supply of high-cost products, driving vertical integration in the first place.;The second chapter of my dissertation (co-authored with Ranjay Gulati) analyzes the degree of complementarity between relationship strength and the quality of information exchange achieved between transacting parties in vertical sourcing arrangements. After showing that these outcomes represent complements of moderate degree, we examine the separate effects of governance form on each of these outcomes. Using survey data on the procurement transactions of two major automobile manufacturers, we find that the form of governance chosen for a transaction does indeed have distinct effects on information exchange and iv relationship strength, which must be taken into account as one considers the impact of governance form on overall collaboration.;The third chapter (co-authored with Bel4n Villalonga) examines whether the value of corporate diversification increased during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We show that diversification gave firms both financing and investment advantages. First, conglomerates became significantly more leveraged relative to comparable focused firms. Second, conglomerates' access to internal capital markets became more valuable not just because external capital markets became more costly, but also because the efficiency of internal capital allocation increased significantly during the crisis. Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on how and why the value of diversification varies with financial constraints and economic conditions. |
