| This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of patterns in the composition of American boards of directors. The three papers each focus on one type of corporate director: outsiders, women, and workers. The results from the outside director paper suggest that companies employing more female directors tend to employ more outside directors, and that the increase in board independence from employing female directors results in improved firm performance. This supports normative agency theory models of board composition and recent policy changes; increasing board independence will improve corporate financial outcomes. The female director paper tests whether human or social capital theories explain patterns in female director employment. It posits a trade-off between the development of human and social capital in female directors, such that companies requiring high director-level human capital tend to employ more male directors and companies requiring high director-level social capital tend to employ more female directors. The empirical results support this model. Finally, the worker director paper analyzes the appropriate role of employees on boards of directors using real options theory. The predictions suggest that employee governance is desirable in some labor contracts, but would worsen efficiency and labor market outcomes in other settings. |
