| This dissertation, written under the direction of Assistant Professor Deborah Swenson, examines several aspects of the economics of firm-level exporting. Chapter 2 provides a new theoretical justification for exporting based on informational considerations. A model is constructed using a "bandit problem" structure, in which a firm faces uncertainty as to its ultimate mean profitability and can only reduce the uncertainty by observing noisy single-period profit outcomes. It shows that exporting can be used to strengthen the signal of profit outcomes, leading to superior decisions on the timing of possible market exit.;Chapter 3 shows that these informational considerations can be the basis for dynamic gains from trade by combining the bandit-type model with a model of endogenous economic growth. Compared to the autarky steady state, the free trade steady state of this combined model is typically characterized by more rapid innovation of new products, as firms anticipate quicker resolution of their profit uncertainty.;The remainder of the study (Chapters 4--7) is empirically oriented, with two main contributions. The first is a reexamination of the conclusions (advanced elsewhere in the literature) that sunk export entry costs play an important role in determining a firm's export status and that these costs account for the extent of observed export persistence. A simple procedure is used that effectively tightens the criteria for a sunk cost interpretation in dynamic regressions of export status. With the data used here, a sunk cost interpretation is not supported.;The second empirical contribution is an examination of exporting behavior by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations. Using a panel of confidential data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, export determinants that have been highlighted in previous studies of different types of firms are shown to have broadly similar effects on the export status decisions of these affiliates. In addition, the internal structure of the multinational corporation to which a given affiliate belongs is shown to affect export decisions. In particular, its positioning of other (related) affiliates can complement or substitute for exporting by the affiliate. |
