| This dissertation concerns transitions to democracy when key actors in the process have asymmetric information. If actors have different or private information about relevant variables (such as important divisions within the incumbent ruling group, the level of dissatisfaction of the opposition, masses or some pivot social group, or the regime's cost of coercion) it will effect their strategies and the outcome of their interaction. To study how private information affects regime changes, this dissertation analyzes four dynamic games of incomplete information models of transitions based on game-theory. The models are then supported by four empirical cases—China, Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan—to form analytic narratives.; Some of the study's findings are as follows: transition is an equilibrium outcome if and only if the opposition has private information; transitions do not require that the opposition be uncertain about the dictator's type; having private information does not necessarily advantage the dictator; and the greatest constraint on democratic forces occurs when the dictator is weakest. In addition, this research provides a framework for explaining how transitions occur based on an authoritarian leader's misperception of the breath and intensity of his opposition. |
