| Non-cooperative game theory models are developed to examine systematically the efficiency and effectiveness of various approaches to the enforcement of environmental regulations. Better enforcement of environmental regulations would improve environmental conditions around the globe, not only by increasing compliance with existing regulations, but also by reducing demands on enforcement agencies' scarce resources.;Environmental laws and regulations in Japan, Canada and the United States of America are reviewed. Contemporary enforcement systems in North America are assessed and fundamental problems that hinder effective enforcement are clarified. Game models are constructed to analyse enforcement efficiency in the context of the dynamic relationship between an environmental agency and a regulated operator. More specifically, the enforcement conflict is modelled as a 2 x 2 non-cooperative game called the Enforcement Dilemma. This Dilemma is then examined as a one-stage game, as a more realistic sequential two-stage game with asymmetric information, and finally as a repeated game with and without perfect information. An effective long-term policy called the review strategy is proposed to overcome the dilemma in the repeated game framework. In the context of review strategies, a penalty system is proposed not as the basis of deterrence, but rather as a supplemental system to enhance voluntary compliance. The effectiveness of self-monitoring and self-reporting systems is modelled, analysed, and assessed. The foregoing game-theoretic models represent a valuable contribution to the assessment of current environmental enforcement rules and practices and to the design of new enforcement strategies that are both effective and efficient. |
