Husserl's theory of a priori knowledge: A response to the failure of contemporary rationalis

I argue that recent rationalists' accounts of a priori knowledge suffer from two substantial weaknesses: (1) an inadequate phenomenology of a priori insight (i.e. rational intuition), and (2) the error of psychologism. I show that Husserl's theory of a priori knowledge presents a defensible and viable alternative for the contemporary rationalist, an alternative that addresses both the ontology and phenomenology of rational intuition, as well as such contemporary concerns as the possibility and character of a priori error, the empirical defeasibility of a priori claims, the relation of mind to necessity, and the role of conception and imagination in a priori knowledge. Consequently, I conclude that Husserl's theory provides the needed response to the 20 th century critique of rationalism, and its attendant a priorism, as mysterious and obscure.