The context of being: Heidegger's critique of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel (Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)

This study interprets the movement of Heidegger's famous “turn” (Kebre, c. 1930) through an analysis of his critique of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the period spanning roughly 1925 to 1936. Heidegger's “turn” sought to overcome the traditional metaphysical conception of being that had come to absolute expression through Hegel's method of dialectical reflection. Heidegger was successful to the extent that he provided the final “con-text” (“Zusammen-hang”) of being as a discourse that both frames the historical “text” of being and permeates it, allowing the coherence of that text to appear in a new light. Heidegger's interpretation of the original sense of time as temporality opposed the latent dogmatism in Kant's critique of reason by shifting the locus of unity in experience away from the spontaneity of the self toward an intuitional transcending of the self as “being-in-the-world.” This pointed Heidegger toward a novel revelatory conception of freedom as “letting being be,” which he posed as an alternative to the absolutizing of subjectivity that took place in German idealism. Heidegger used Schellings anti-Hegelian conception of the origination of freedom from nature to clarify the meaning of Hegel's key metaphysical notion of reflection. In so doing he developed an alternative interpretation of the “nothing,” in contrast to Hegel's method of double negation, that set the meaning of negation into a greater contextual perspective. Heidegger's goal of uncovering the meaning and possibility of reflection (the coherence of being) as the original possibility of evil led him to a qualified retrieval of his early Roman Catholic orientation to thinking. Transforming these paradigms into a new deconstructive discourse, Heidegger advanced beyond Schellings critique of Hegel, allowing him to establish a hermeneutical relationship with Hegel's system that simultaneously confronts and preserves it. Heidegger's early phenomenological interpretation of Pauline eschatology and Augustinian original sin thus, finally situates his interpretation of the “nothing” as the abyss of being retrieved from the primal Greek conception of nature (Physis). Heidegger thereby provides the ultimate “con-text” of metaphysics in its necessary and reciprocal relation to Hegel's conception of presence (parousia) as an all-encompassing, “self-absolving” system.