Teaching differences: An explication and defense of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' (Ludwig Wittgenstein)

Wittgenstein's writing is notoriously obscure. And his epistemological views are not widely read and, as much as they are, they are not widely accepted. This dissertation is a defense of these views as published under the title of On Certainty. Given the obscurity of his writing and the variety of interpretations it lends itself to, in order to defend his position I spell out what I take Wittgenstein's position to consist in as well as what its aim is, namely a dissolution rather than refutation of the skeptical position. My aim is to bring to the forefront Wittgenstein's views as a real and worthy alternative to widely read responses to skepticism. Hopefully, this will help in alleviating the dismissive approach that many readers of Wittgenstein have towards his work.; Chapter one is a general overview of traditional responses to the problem of regress. I focus on foundationalist and coherentist views and pinpoint the impasses that such views lead to.; In chapter two I explain what Wittgenstein means by the term “weltbild”, while also discussing aspects of On Certainty that relate to it. I also focus on aspects of Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy that are essential to understanding his more mature thought.; Chapter three deals with Wittgenstein's reaction to Moore's Proof of the External World and his views on certainty, knowledge and doubt. In the process of expounding these, I argue against the idea that Wittgenstein is putting forward a foundationalist or a contextualist theory.; In chapter four I expound Wittgenstein's dissolution of skepticism of the external world. I argue that Wittgenstein dissolves skepticism by showing that lack of reason is not correlative with doubt.; In chapter five I take up three major objections leveled against Wittgenstein. The first comes from Grice's work on pragmatics and semantics. I argue that Wittgenstein does not commit the error of confusing the two but instead makes a valid point concerning the meaning, and use, of the term “knowledge” and related words. I then take up Ayer's direct objections to On Certainty focusing on Wittgenstein's position vis-à-vis defenses of common sense, the dream argument and idealist alternatives to common sense such as Berkeley's. Finally, I discuss Jonathan Adler's tacit confirmation view that he advances as an alternative to unsuccessful attempts against skepticism in which he includes Wittgenstein's.; Lastly, chapter six tackles the issues of relativism and verificationism that are the most often heard objections against Wittgenstein's work. I argue that characterizing Wittgenstein's later work as either verificationist or relativist does not do justice to his writing and is the outcome of a partial, and erroneous, reading of his work.