Tradition in the ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and philosophy

In After Virtue (1981), Alasdair MacIntyre defended Aristotelian teleological virtue theory, while rejecting “Aristotle's metaphysical biology.” MacIntyre argued that virtues are qualities needed to succeed in practices, in life, and in tradition. Critics claimed this made tradition the measure of morality. MacIntyre clarified his theory of tradition in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990). These later works also defended Thomistic metaphysics. Critics again claimed that MacIntyre's ethics entailed moral relativism. Some added that his relativism contradicted his Thomism. Others said his defense of Thomism was ideological. This dissertation examines MacIntyre's career and his theory; then it investigates the claims of his critics to clarify the meaning and implications of that theory.; Chapter One uses interviews and published works to trace MacIntyre's philosophical development. MacIntyre was educated at a crossroads between conflicting traditions; his efforts to bring consistency to his own thought provided the foundation for his theory of rationality.; Chapter Two examines MacIntyre's theory. For MacIntyre, “rationality” names the resources people employ to determine the apparent truth or falsity of propositions. Many substantive elements of rationality are formed through education in a tradition; thus rationality is tradition-constituted. Rationality becomes tradition-constitutive when people overcome unforeseen problems and share new ways of judging. Our assessment of truth is largely tradition-dependent, while the truth itself is not.; Chapter Three addresses criticisms that MacIntyre's approach is relativistic. It divides these critiques into three groups, clarifies misinterpretations, addresses difficulties identified by critics of After Virtue, and affirms that MacIntyre finds “the best theory so far” to be the best possible outcome in philosophy.; Chapter Four considers whether MacIntyre's theory is inconsistent with Thomism. It compares MacIntyre's positions on truth, teleology, and natural law to those of Thomas Aquinas, and finds that MacIntyre maintains the metaphysical resources necessary to defend Thomism on each point.; Chapter Five engages the claim that MacIntyre's Thomism is ideological. It looks into the relations between philosophy, religion, theology, and ideology. It considers the rationality of MacIntyre's defense of Thomism, and questions the relative merits of his critics' anti-theological presuppositions.