The Eisenhower administration and the Middle East: Containment, communism, and Arab nationalism

This dissertation analyzes the Eisenhower administration's response to Arab nationalism. It is argued that the Eisenhower administration adopted a policy aimed at dividing Arab countries and exploiting inter-Arab rivalries. One faction, led by President Eisenhower, favored reaching an accommodation with Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, but another faction, led by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, opposed rapprochement with the Egyptian leader. Eisenhower argued that Nasser was concerned about communism in Egypt, but Dulles argued that Nasser was untrustworthy, anti-Western, and aligned with the Soviet Union. According to Dulles, Nasser and pan-Arab nationalism were temporary. The Secretary favored containing pan-Arab nationalism and supporting pro-Western Arab governments to rival Nasser. Dulles believed that Arabs were united only in their hatred of Israel, but shortly after the 1956 Suez Crisis he dismissed attempts to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute. According to the Secretary, Jews in the United States prohibited the Americans from accommodating Arab governments and Jews in the Soviet Union prohibited the Soviets from fully supporting Arab nations that wanted to destroy Israel. The Soviets would be kept out of the Middle East, in Dulles's policy, through intimidation. He argued that the U.S. should use its strategic superiority to pressure the Soviets into restraining Nasser.