Richard Rorty's revised pragmatism: Promise for and challenge to Christian theology (with special reference to the philosophy of Charles Taylor

Richard Rorty advances an influential post-Philosophical "philosophy" with deep impulses antithetical to Christian faith. I defend Rorty's critique of modern empiricism, and concur with his critiques of some popular Christian understandings, but contend that his most profound objection to Christianity springs from problematic modern ideals.;Under the direction of Professor Diogenes Allen, I argue Rorty is best read along an empiricist trajectory emerging out of Quine and Davidson. I defend Rorty's appropriation of Davidson on truth and language, and clarify the anti-reductionistic intent motivating his anti-representationalism (not realism, idealism, or anti-realism). On my reading, Rorty powerfully reasserts the integrity, even priority, of the Geisteswissenschaften. Moreover, I demonstrate Rorty's anti-representationalist philosophy to be the source of eminently reasonable (if chastened) understandings of truth, language, reality, reason, argument, knowledge, tradition and change.;However, utilizing Charles Taylor, I argue that Rorty allows modern atomistic ideals of autonomy and authenticity to drive him toward axiological solipsism, wherein things outside the self exist but have no non-instrumental significance. That is, these ideals preclude any openness to call from the other (neighbor, nature, or God). This results in Rorty's unsatisfactory contention that consolation lies in self-creation, explains his troubling need to deny the intrinsic force of our deepest moral intuitions, and mortally compromises his quest for solidarity.;Significantly, the very holist trajectory driving Rorty beyond Quine and Davidson should itself vitiate his lingering modem ideals. Taylor's more thorough holism corrects Rorty, freeing us of epistemological entanglements which obstruct embrace of our most profound interpersonal, ecological, and spiritual intuitions. Insofar as Taylor enables Rorty to articulate Rorty's own deepest convictions while not violating Rorty's anti-representationalism, Rorty should abandon lingering modern ideals and (though rejecting Taylor's attachment to Dilthey) join Taylor's ongoing investigation into the contours and reality of selves and community, truth and goods. While not expressly theological, this philosophical investigation must include openness to the touch of divine love (and to testimony thereto).