| This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which develops a formal model to investigate some aspect of judicial power. The introduction provides an overview of recent developments in the field, and situates the three essays in the extant literature. The first essay addresses the puzzle of judicial independence, and develops a model showing how stable political competition between rival parties creates conditions conducive to independent review. Cross-country empirical tests provide support for several of the hypotheses derived from the formal model. The second essay seeks to explain when and why public opinion will support the judicial branch in case of a conflict with the legislative or executive. The formal model used to analyze this issue stresses the degree to which voters can learn about the policies that are in their own best interests by observing the revealed preferences of the courts and the policy branches. The relative reliability of the information gleaned from judicial activism and conservatism as compared to government activism and conservatism can determine which institutions the public will support, and when. The third essay investigates the norm of deference to precedent, or “stare decisis,” and proposes an explanation why even a purely policy-oriented judge might modify a decision to conform to established precedent, even when doing so requires deviation from the legal holding the judge would otherwise prefer. The key dynamic driving the formal model in which this behavior emerges is the inherently imperfect communication between appellate judges and trial judges. Deference to precedent can often improve the accuracy of communication, and this improved accuracy is sometimes valuable enough to appellate judges that they are willing to modify their decisions. |
