Party government in the United States Senate

This dissertation addresses the extent to which parties are useful analytic tools for understanding the Senate's organization, history, and member behavior. Contrary to the received wisdom that unanimous consent is the foundation of senatorial action and that policy is determined by the committee of the whole, I show that partisan control provides a more effective explanation of patterns in organization and behavior in the modern Senate. In doing so, I evaluate the partisan model within each congress as well as over time from the late 19th century to the contemporary period. For the time series analysis, the institutional variation in the means by which senators are elected provides a 'natural' comparative static to test important implications of the partisan model. I argue that since senators came under popular control, the same general electoral dynamics that drive organization and behavior in the House exist in the Senate as well. While the Senate faces unique institutional constraints to party government, lessons from recent House scholarship are more relevant to the Senate than commonly presumed.;My evidence consists of an historical analysis of Senate committee compositions (1877--1989) and the effect of new member assignments on ideological representativeness (1947--1989), an analysis of final passage votes and their outcomes to expose who is controlling the floor agenda (1877--1999), and an analysis of the relationship between Senatorial electoral change and partisan agenda control and loyalty (1877--1913).