Curbing international bribery and corruption in Thailand: Prospects for reform in light of the OECD Convention

In 1997, two notable documents were adopted in different parts of the world, both of which appear likely have an impact on efforts to curtail corruption. The first was a pact outlawing cross-border bribery of foreign public officials that was signed by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and several other nations. The second was a new constitution for the Kingdom of Thailand that established several independent agencies empowered to investigate allegations of official corruption and impose penalties on politicians or civil servants found guilty of infractions.; Forty academics, executives, and officials living in Thailand were asked a series of questions related to these developments. These in-depth interviews lasted for about an hour and were tape recorded; the transcripts that were produced and translated comprised the raw data used in the research project. Sources were first asked to describe the reasons why multinational firms have paid off Thai officials and why these payoffs have been so difficult to curb. They were then asked to predict the impact that the OECD Convention Combating International Bribery will have on multinationals that operate in Thailand.; Sources were invited to contrast projected differences in results between countries that have signed the accord and non-signatory nations like Thailand. The perspectives of the three informant groups were also compared and differences noted and examined. Respondents were asked how international bodies and signatory governments might help multinational firms handle problems associated with questionable payments more effectively. The study searched for strategies--- best practices---that have enabled foreign firms to successfully deal with corrupt practices and the outcomes associated with these approaches.; The interviews concluded by asking informants to identify societal factors and other causes that have made off-the-record payoffs so common in Thailand. It asked them to pinpoint the social changes that would help to curtail the use of illicit payoffs and to suggest initiatives that appear feasible. Sources were asked how such changes might take place, whether multinational firms might have a role in facilitating them, and what that role might be. Patterns and themes that emerged were described and analyzed.