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The politics of the environment: An analysis of state regulations and special interest behavior

Posted on:2004-01-30Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of FloridaCandidate:Davis, Mary ElizabethFull Text:PDF
GTID:1466390011963932Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:
Why do some states pass strict environmental regulations, while others are content with the baseline standards required by the federal government? This dissertation seeks to answer that question by looking at the costs and benefits to a state from developing strong environmental standards. This work outlines the state environmental choice as a tradeoff between the desires of consumers (who want better environmental quality) and of producers (who want less restrictive environmental standards). A rational state legislator maximizes her chances of being re-elected by balancing these two competing forces when setting environmental policy. This dissertation provides empirical evidence that the differences in state standards for sulfur dioxide and toxic metals are a function of per capita income levels, special interest participation, strength of polluting industries, and natural differences in climate and location that inflate the cost of compliance.;Also explored in Chapter 5 of the dissertation is the degree to which special interest voter scorecards are representative of actual candidate positions on certain issues. An analysis of a series of voter guides from the League of Conservation Voters and the Christian Coalition provides evidence that these organizations slant the reported positions of candidates by including non-issue partisan votes in the calculation of their scorecards. Including these peripheral votes allows the groups to increase the scores of their favored party members and decrease the scores of the opposing party.
Keywords/Search Tags:State, Special interest, Environmental, Standards
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