United States-Haiti relations from 1957 to 1963: Anticommunism, nation-building, and racial diplomacy in the age of national liberation

This research demonstrates how the foreign policies of the Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy administrations toward Haiti were influenced by the politics of anticommunism and the modernization theories of the late 1950s and early 1960s. U.S. policy makers believed that by providing military and economic aid to Haiti's ruler, President Francois Duvalier, they would ensure political stability and economic progress. Contented Haitians, then, would not be tempted to experiment with communism. U.S. officials also hoped that the rebuilding of Haiti through American aid would convince the leaders of emerging black nations of Africa and the Caribbean to embrace "humanitarian" capitalism instead of communism, thus allowing the U.S. to win an important battle of the Cold War.; Following Duvalier's fraudulent election as President, in 1957, the Eisenhower administration decided to raise the level of its economic and military aid to Haiti in order to stabilize and develop the country. However, Duvalier used this support mainly to tame the opposition. Still, American officials continued to support him because they thought he could become a valuable diplomatic ally. Since he was the ruler of an independent "black" country, he could rally soon-to-be independent African nations to the Western camp. By 1960, however, the Eisenhower administration realized that its policy had failed.; In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy administration launched a new aid program for Latin America built on the premise that only massive U.S. government funding could help poorer countries initiate an economic "take-off" phase. President Kennedy believed that Haiti should become the showcase of the program; if the U.S. could lift it from its economic morass, than it would show to Latin American, African, and Caribbean nations that humanitarian capitalism could work anywhere. Duvalier, however, used U.S. aid to strengthen his terror apparatus and illegally extend his term in office instead of "modernizing" Haiti. This left American policy makers only two options: send troops into Haiti to oust him or accept the status quo. Fearing the uproar an invasion of Haiti could generate among Latin American nations, which adhered strongly to the principle of non-intervention, and among African states, which could disapprove of white soldiers landing in Haiti, they elected to bow to Duvalier.