| While much research considers how international cooperation can occur given the absence of a central authority, little attention has been devoted to the actual technology of cooperation. We know that international agreements are central to global cooperation, but we do not know what characteristics of agreements facilitate cooperation in particular contexts. My work begins to rectify this shortcoming by using game theory to investigate the precise mechanisms through which cooperation can emerge.; Regarding international cooperation, conventional wisdom holds that the more a state can tie its hands, the more credible its commitment. Yet we observe that many international agreements include provisions for renegotiation, escape, and withdrawal. This suggests that, rather than maximizing their hands-tying, states face a trade-off between flexibility and rigidity.; States make and keep agreements in contexts characterized by economic, political, and technological uncertainty. Hence agreements must incorporate the proper degree of flexibility. If agreements include too little, then states may renege or not sign on at all. If agreements include too much, they may fail to accomplish their objectives.; I investigate two flexibility-enhancing devices: duration and renegotiation provisions. I develop two game-theoretic models that show how the characteristics of the potential parties to an agreement, such as their degree of risk aversion, and characteristics of the environment, such as the form and degree of uncertainty present, affect the optimal choice of these provisions. Detailed examinations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the International Coffee Agreements, and the G-7 informal macroeconomic agreements show that the factors highlighted in my models play important roles in actual agreements.; I also report the results of the first systematic effort to create a data set containing detailed information on the provisions of a large, random sample of international agreements. Defining and collecting the sample raises a number of important technical and conceptual issues that I discuss. I analyze agreements from four issue areas: economics, human rights, security, and environment. I document substantial variation in flexibility-enhancing provisions among agreements as well as a number of important patterns in these provisions, thereby providing an initial large-sample test of my models. |
