Neither peace nor honor: Vietnamization, United States withdrawal, and the fall of South Vietnam

This study examines the fall of South Vietnam, focusing on the role of President Richard M. Nixon's Vietnamization policy and the impact of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia on the ultimate outcome of the Third Indochina War in 1975.;When Nixon assumed office in 1969, he and his advisers instituted a new policy to turn over the responsibility for the war in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese, so U.S. forces could be withdrawn. Between 1969 and 1973, there was a concerted effort to improve the combat capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. This included an increased advisory effort and additional military aid to bolster the South Vietnamese forces. As this program was pursued Henry Kissinger met secretly with Communist representatives in Paris in an attempt to forge a peace settlement.;As the peace negotiations continued with little progress, the war raged on in Vietnam. The Vietnamization effort was tested during the Cambodian incursion of 1970, Operation LAM SON 719 into Laos in 1971, and received its severest challenge during the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972. The South Vietnamese almost succumbed in 1972, but with the aid of U.S. support were ultimately victorious. This victory and the peace accord hammered out by Kissinger in Paris permitted the U.S. to withdraw its last troops from South Vietnam.;With U.S. forces gone, the South Vietnamese were confronted with North Vietnamese combat forces left in place by the terms of the Paris Accords. During 1973-1974, an undeclared war continued unabated, despite the cease-fire. By 1974, U.S. interest in the events in South Vietnam had waned and this resulted in a steep decline in American military aid. The North Vietnamese launched an attack into Phuoc Long Province in late 1974 to test South Vietnamese and U.S. reactions. The South Vietnamese performed abysmally and the U.S. did nothing. Based on the results of this battle, the North Vietnamese leadership launched a major offensive. The South Vietnamese collapsed and the entire country fell in just fifty-five days.;This dissertation seeks to understand why the South Vietnamese, after intensive U.S. training efforts and millions of dollars worth of equipment and weapons, performed so dismally. It concludes that Nixon's Vietnamization program and the terms of the Paris Accords coupled with poor South Vietnamese senior leadership, rampant corruption, and the decline of U.S. military aid to doom South Vietnam's survival as a nation.