Political instability, dual transitions, and militarized interstate conflict in the post-Cold War era

A vast body of international relations literature argues that democracies do not fight each another. Mansfield and Snyder (1995a, 1995b), however, caution that regimes in the midst of democratic transition are highly war-prone. They base their theory exclusively on major powers that democratized prior to World War II. Yet, relatively small developing countries comprise the majority of recent democratizing regimes.; This dissertation examines the foreign policy strategies of democratizing regimes in the developing world that do not have major power status. I argue that "dual transitions" (the coincidence of democratization and economic liberalization) can weaken regimes to the point where they become vulnerable targets for foreign states ("challengers") bent on redressing their grievances. Specifically, when there is an asymmetrical relationship between two states, and a conflict of interest has reached a diplomatic stalemate, the weaker challenger is likely to invoke a limited aims/military fait accompli strategy either capture the attention of a third party that will pressure the target to negotiate.; More importantly, I contend that political instability explains recent militarized interstate conflicts to a greater extent than does democratization per se. Put simply, it is political instability that provides aggrieved weaker states with an opportunity to compel their relatively powerful adversaries to negotiate. Still, dual transitions are important insofar as they represent one possible source of political instability.; This theoretical framework is tested via statistical analysis and two case studies. The statistical analysis spans 1816--1992 and evaluates only the relationship between political instability and war. The two primary case studies, by contrast, are drawn exclusively from the Post-Cold War era and illustrate the entire linkage between dual transitions, political instability, and war. They include the Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998--ongoing) and the Ecuador-Peru (1995) wars. I also apply the framework to the recent militarized conflict between India and Pakistan (1999), which involved a third party strategy on the part of the challenger and a politically unstable target. Overall, the evidence supports the argument associating political instability in a more powerful state with a belligerent foreign policy strategy on the part of the weaker challenger. Policy and theoretical implications are discussed in the conclusion.