Speed bumps and roadblocks: Procedural controls and regulatory change

This work is an attempt to evaluate procedural controls that politicians use to constrain bureaucratic discretion. Political scientists have asserted that procedural controls allow enacting coalitions of politicians to influence future bureaucratic decisions. Administrative law scholars have asserted that procedural controls have "ossified" the rulemaking process and as a result, bureaucrats now avoid rulemaking. This work casts doubt on both of these assertions.; I examine eight case studies of state licensing of child care facilities. In these eight states, procedural controls appear to have little effect on the pace of regulatory change. Bureaucrats are not avoiding rulemaking in the face of a procedure laden environment. The only control that enacting coalitions can use to deter future change and influence future policy is statutory specificity. The remainder of the controls I study, an office to review rules, requirements for analysis or participation, and mandatory reviews of rules all have minimal effects on the pace and substance of regulatory change.; One important reason that procedural controls do not deter regulatory change or ensure the desires of enacting coalitions is that they are in the control of existing coalitions. In the case studies presented here, existing coalitions and interest groups emerge as the most important influences in the bureaucratic environment. The effect that procedural controls have is determined largely by the choice of existing coalitions on how to use them.; When enacting coalitions pass a statute, they have three choices. They can place as much detail as possible in the statute and minimize the choices left to bureaucrats. They can put in place procedures that they hope will constrain future bureaucratic decisions. Or, they can leave bureaucrats a great deal of discretion to make policy choices. The primary finding of this work is that the second and third choices are extremely similar.