Conflict management techniques: A case study of the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991

The Persian Gulf Crisis was the result of a combination of many complex factors, including Kuwait's noncompliance with Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) regulations, Saddam Hussein's ambitions to become the undisputed Arab leader, mixed messages and signals received by Iraq from the United States, the U.S. and Western fear of Iraqi hegemony in the Middle East and insufficient attention paid to the developing tension in the Middle East between Iraq and the Gulf States.; As a result, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded the sovereign state of Kuwait, thus beginning the Persian Gulf Crisis (PGC), which raised many questions regarding the effectiveness of various instruments of conflict resolution used by the different powers. It also raised questions concerning the violation of territorial integrity of a sovereign state, the changing role of the United Nations as the main international peace-keeping body, the hegemonic role of the United States in the post-Cold War world, and the international mood concerning a Third World aggressor.; This dissertation examines the extent to which five conflict management techniques were applied in the Persian Gulf Crisis and evaluate their relative effectiveness. These techniques include deterrence, economic sanctions, collective security (non-economic and military aspects), negotiation and coercive diplomacy, all of which were applied at various times during the crisis. Using the five strategies, I examine the three main phases of PGC and the role of the actors, concentrating more on the pre-war period and the war itself, as they better relate to this research.; The purpose of the research is also to examine whether certain techniques were more successful during certain stages of the crisis. And, finally, I examine the question of whether the crisis could have been dealt with by diplomatic means, thereby avoiding the resort to force.