| How can states meet the challenges of the demands for territorial revision by nationalist groups so as to maintain the peace and stability of the international system? This is the question that this dissertation seeks to answer, focusing on the relationship between nationalism, territory, and responses. Nationalism and national identity are strong forces for people and states, and are linked to the belief in the need for a territorial homeland--self-determination. In light of the competing principles of territorial sovereignty and self-determination, other states determine whether to intervene in order to resolve conflicts over territory.; I argue that states should deter Imperialists, those groups or states seeking to acquire territory for which they have no historical claims or national/ethnic kin. States, however, should pursue a firm-but-flexible strategy (mixed strategy of firmness and accommodation) towards Consolidationists seeking to revise borders to reflect historical claims and ethnic composition. In very rare circumstances, Consolidationist demands should be accommodated.; The two independent variables (territorial revision and state responses) affect whether international stability and peace will emerge. When demands for territorial border revision are based on historical claims, population composition, and recurring conflict, I argue that deterrence may lead to negative consequences, namely a wider conflict, and thus greater international instability.; I explore four historical case studies to illustrate the argument: (1) the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars; (2) Bismarck and German unification; (3) Hitler's Germany; and (4) the Korean War. The concluding chapter addresses the implications for policy through a brief examination of a contemporary case of a consolidationist demand for territorial revision: the former Yugoslavia. |
