The roots of the Cold War in Western Europe: The United States, France, and German rearmament, 1950-1954

This dissertation examines how France and the United States resolved the controversial issue of German rearmament during the early 1950s. Its primary purpose is to explain the foundation of the Cold War order in Western Europe.; In September 1950, the United States proposed to the Atlantic Alliance large-scale German rearmament in order to present a geo-political counterweight to the Soviet Union. France balked this proposal, however, because it was concerned that rearming Germany would lead to a rebirth of German militarism and its dire consequences. Nonetheless, in 1954 France accepted German remilitarization as well as German membership in NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).; This dissertation has two objectives. The first is to determine why Washington did not take forceful measures against Paris given four years of French delays on the European army. In light of the high priority it accorded German rearmament, why was America neither willing nor able to either coerce French acceptance, or rearm Germany in spite of French opposition? I argue that while strong-arming or bypassing France altogether might have been the most expedient way in which to carry out this policy, compelling reasons dictated a more finessed approach. These reasons centered around America's fear of Soviet retaliation, its unwillingness to alienate France, and its lack of confidence in the stability of German democracy.; The second objective is to explain why France ultimately acceded to German rearmament. Many believe that in its efforts to wage the Cold War, the United States forced the re-militarization of Germany upon its Atlantic Allies, France in particular. However, this interpretation is open to serious challenge. Although U.S. pressure played a role, far more decisive factors led France to drop its opposition to rearming Germany. France's decision to accept German rearmament rested on the cumulative effects of several factors independent of U.S. pressure. In short, French officials decided that while there were significant drawbacks to rearming the Federal Republic, they would nonetheless be greatly overshadowed by France's continued opposition. More to the point, French officials did not view German rearmament as an unmitigated negative--to the contrary, they believed that the French state could benefit from this move if it played its cards right.