Computer hackers and rogue programs: Is there a cure

The phenomena of computer "viruses", "rogue programs" and computer "hackers" is a widespread and growing problem. The expanding national and international information infrastructure; the increasing number of subscribers to the various Internet services; and the advancement of technology in general create a fertile ground for anyone who intends to abuse those services.; Several articles have been written about this burning issue, yet none of them, to the best of my knowledge, have analyzed it implementing the tools of economic analysis of law. The majority of those articles have tried to deal with and to answer only specific problems, without attending to general questions such as who should bear the cost of the damaging activity; who the "right" plaintiffs and defendants are; what level of liability should be imposed, and upon whom; and whether we should use criminal or civil law or both to face this detrimental activity.; My argument in this dissertation is that while direct deterrence of the virus' creator, or of the hacker, is of immense importance, it should not be regarded as the sole objective. Such deterrence is but one component of what should be our main goal of minimizing the damage caused by these virus' creators and hackers, and reducing the costs of its prevention.; In my opinion, the scope of potential bearers of liability is much wider, and apart from the creators of the viruses, and the hackers, may include: the Internet service providers, manufacturers of software, manufacturers of "anti-virus programs", end users etc. An important aspect of this dilemma is that often the tort-feasor is hard to find (many times he resides far from the scene of damage). Moreover, establishing a causal link between him and the damage might be problematical, thus making it hard for the plaintiff to recover his losses. I will examine how imposing liability on one of the above participant can affect the type and level of activity of the other participants. I will further consider whether a joint liability regime would be appropriate, bearing in mind that the standards of liability imposed upon each participant may be different.