| To what extent do countries cooperate or compete in their relations with one another? Specifically, why do democratic states launch international trade disputes choosing potentially costly arbitration of trade practices pertaining to a certain product or sector, when they could settle at lower cost "out-of-court"? This dissertation posits that Right-leaning and Left-leaning governments have different trade policy preferences and make systematically different decisions about whether to initiate, settle, and resolve international trade disputes. I find that partisan politics plays a role in the decision to initiate trade disputes, even in an age of globalization, with Right governments launching more export-oriented disputes. While Left governments launch fewer disputes, they are more contentious when they do. Partisanship also affects trade dispute resolution and compliance, with Left-leaning governments being less likely to comply. The decision to initiate or not initiate, and the decision to comply or not comply with adverse rulings on trade disputes will be affected by domestic pressures and institutions, including who wins and who loses if the decision is implemented, the locus of decision-making necessary to comply, and the overall structure of government. Advanced industrialized governments make systematically different decisions, based on partisan alignments toward dispute initiation and settlement. A formal model of WTO implementation and compliance is posited, which predicts that when left-leaning parties, those who tend to favor protection for domestic labor and markets, control government, compliance rates tend to fall. In contrast, right-leaning defendants, those who weigh highly market access and returns to capital, should be more willing to comply with adverse WTO rulings. These hypotheses are tested using data from WTO trade disputes involving twenty-five advanced industrialized countries and the European Union from 1970-2000. |
