Equilibrium problems in network spatial competition models (Spanish text)

In this book we revise the problems of spatial competition. An extension of certain network spatial games, analysing different scenarios, comparing results and studying the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is presented. The term spatial game is used to refer to those problems of spatial competition, in which a number of firms try to enter and compete in a market where established firms do not exist, deciding on the location of its services and pricing policy or the level of production. Equilibrium analysis allows us to establish a situation which none of the firms wishes to modify.; Chapter 1 introduces the most important characteristics, which differentiate the spatial competition models treated in literature.; Chapter 2 compiles the classical models of competition and introduces noncooperative games, some types of equilibrium solutions and results related to their existence and uniqueness.; Chapter 3 studies a spatial game in which two competing firms supply the same product in a spatially separated market. The equilibrium solutions to different scenarios (depending on either quantity or price competition, elastic or totally inelastic demand with respect to price, and various conjectures in relation to how different firms believe their competitors will react) are analysed and compared.; In Chapter 4, the models of the previous chapter are extended to the oligopoly. In both of these chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) a two-stage game where the firms compete in location anticipating subsequent competition in price or quantity, is considered.; In Chapter 5, negative externalities are introduced by considering a model in which each individual consumer is affected by actions carried out by the others. In these cases, apart from the price and the cost of transport, consumers must take into account a cost associated to the effect of the externality. Two scenarios are analysed: one in which the users take joint decisions minimising the aggregate costs to obtain a Pareto optimal allocation, and another where the users take individual decisions obtaining a Nash equilibrium.; Finally, Chapter 6 is dedicated to conclusions and possible future fields of study.