Overkill: The effect of dynamic two-level pressures on rivalry escalation and de-escalation

This dissertation project proposes a dynamic two-level model of rivalry escalation and de-escalation. I highlight both domestic and international conditions that are likely to increase the chances that a state escalates or de-escalates its relations with a rival. Specifically, the theory suggests that elites can use information asymmetries between themselves and the citizenry to inflate external threats from other rivals. Threat inflation can in turn constrain decision-makers in the future, making de-escalation less likely and escalation more likely. This occurs through a process where elites "outbid" each other to promote strength and stability in the face of a perceived threat, a process I call rivalry outbidding. Furthermore, the behavior of the rival can either reinforce this outbidding by increasing international conflict, or ease the domestic tension by attempting cooperation. The theory is tested statistically in a cross-sectional time series analysis, and further illustrated with three case studies (Ethiopia-Somalia, Egypt-Israel, and US-China). The empirical results strongly support the importance of high dynamic two-level pressures in perpetuating and igniting rivalry escalation.