| In the first chapter, Uri Gneezy, Aldo Rustichim and I investigate causes for the pervasiveness of large gender differences in competitive high-ranking positions. In our experiment, when women and men compete against one another, women perform less well than men, even if they perform similarly in noncompetitive environments. We observe a significantly higher gender gap in performance in mixed sex tournaments, than when participants are paid piece rates or compete in single sex tournaments. Hence women are able to perform in competitive environments, but less so in mixed gender ones.; In the second chapter, Georg Kirchsteiger, Jan Potters and I study the structure of markets when traders are given the opportunity to create their own market, as on the internet, where many public exchanges have been replaced by private exchanges. In our experimental markets, when traders can decide whom to inform about an offer, they typically inform all traders on the other side of the market, but not on their own side, resulting in a private, not a public exchange. This private exchange leads to the same outcomes as a double auction. When buyers have transaction costs, only the sellers make private offers, which results in an inefficient market. When we provide incentives for sellers to inform each other, most of the sellers reveal a strict preference to hide offers from rivals. However, when sellers do share price information, they attain a higher price and benefit collectively.; In the last chapter, Alvin E. Roth and I study the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists, which was organized by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 through 1997. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. We find that, both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used, gastroenterologists are less mobile. This suggests that the clearinghouse serves not only to coordinate the timing of appointments, but that it also increases the scope of the market, compared to decentralized markets with early appointments and exploding offers. |
