| This dissertation examines the differential effects of voters' cost perceptions, expected environmental benefits, and normative concerns on support for environmental risk regulation. Using a state-wide random sample of Washington's electorate and contingent valuation (CV) survey methodology, voting behavior for a proposed regulation of gasoline stations is examined under varying cost and distributional assumptions. The CV method of randomly varying prices between respondents is uniquely extended to a distributional application, where the percentage of total regulatory costs polluters are specified to pay is varied randomly between respondents, holding constant the CV price.;Results suggest that voters will be more supportive of environmental risk regulations if (1) they believe polluters are paying a fair share of regulatory costs (holding constant voters' own expected cost); (2) they perceive the environmental resource as a publicly owned good; and (3) they believe firms have large profit margins. These three normative concerns (making polluters pay, enforcing public property rights, and imposing larger burdens on polluters with higher ability to pay) are as important in explaining demand for environmental regulation as are expected environmental benefits. Findings also imply that, absent cost information, supporters will expect the costs of regulation (to themselves) to be marginal, and polluters to absorb a significant share of the regulatory burden. Finally, I show that willingness to pay (WTP) estimates from CV studies are likely to increase the larger the percentage of total regulatory costs polluters are perceived to be contributing, holding constant respondents' expected costs and environmental benefits. |
