Money and power in Europe: The political economy of European monetary cooperation

This dissertation seeks to explain the patterns and regularities of European monetary cooperation since the early 1960s. Its core argument is that the relative balance of payments position of the EC member states shapes the process of rule-making in European monetary relations. The differences between strong and weak currency countries form the key to understanding the patterns in European monetary cooperation over the last three decades.; The theoretical explanation develops in chapters one to five according to a triad of steps. First, the dissertation evaluates the incentives for the EC member states to pursue exchange rate cooperation. These incentives help to explain the emergence of major new initiatives for monetary cooperation. However, by themselves they are insufficient to explain the politics of monetary cooperation in Europe. The second major step analyzes the constraints that have repeatedly confined European monetary cooperation. The main argument presented in this step is that distributive conflicts and concerns among the EC member states have largely driven European monetary politics throughout the last thirty years. Thirdly, the dissertation emphasizes Germany's pivotal role in the process of European monetary cooperation. In crucial distinction from hegemonic stability theories it describes Germany's position in European monetary politics as policy-based rather than resource-based.; The crucial element of the dissertation's empirical parts is its comparative perspective. Chapters six to nine investigate five major attempts at closer exchange rate cooperation within the EC from the early 1960s to the early 1990s: the Action Programme of 1962, the Werner Report of 1970/1, the snake between 1972 and 1979, the European Monetary System operating since 1979 and the attempt to design rules for a monetary union (EMU) in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This comparative perspective helps to trace continuity and changes in the patterns of European monetary politics and uncovers the persistent patterns of European exchange rate cooperation.