| In this study, the problem of structuring sharing arrangements, in academic research, between public and private entities; the university and agrobiotechnology companies, is modeled as a multi-players multi-issues bargaining game. All players stand to be affected by such an agreement, and have a stake, albeit different ones, in the sharing structure. These stakes are captured by carefully assessing players' preferences, which are then introduced into the bargaining model. The model, in turn, is used to explore the various factors that can affect the outcome of negotiations and eventually lead to recommendations about how these kinds of interactions can be smoothly facilitated.;The following is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 identifies the fundamental question that is being investigated in this study, namely; "how to design public-private contracts in academic research, to best serve both university and industry interests?", and discusses the importance of the problem. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework of the analysis: a non-cooperative model of multilateral bargaining, styled after Rausser and Simon (1992), in which a finite collection of players meets together to select a policy from some collection of possible alternatives. The emphasis is on collective decision-making mechanisms. A salient feature of the model is the variable definition of admissible coalitions, subsets of players that have the power to impose a policy decision on the group. The game proceeds through a series of proposals, and either declinations or acceptances from the other players, with the number of bargaining rounds set as limited or unlimited. If agreement is reached, in other words no admissible coalition remains in dissent, a policy is instituted. If the players fail to reach agreement, one of a choice of externally-regulated default options is imposed.;In Chapter 3, the Rausser-Simon framework is employed to identify the best ways to set up university-industry partnerships, using what I refer to as players hypothetical utility functions. These are later replaced with the assessed players utilities, which I believe are the closer representation players' "true" preferences. In particular, in Chapter 4, a series of interviews with individuals, who are selected to coincide as closely as possible with the players described in the bargaining game, is conducted. Representatives of both university and private concerns are questioned about the importance they place on different aspects of a prospective sharing arrangement. This information is put together to arrive at their specific utility functions, which are then introduced into the Rausser-Simon bargaining model. Finally Chapter 5 presents conclusions of the analysis. |
