| If it were possible to have a way to distinguish which phenomena were religious--as opposed to artistic or philosophical phenomena, for example--solely on the basis of their structures, this would be a very useful tool of identification for philosophy of religion. Also, if such a structural tool could be found, it is possible that evolutionary developments of religious systems might also be understood as matters of structural formation. The work of Susanne K. Langer appears useful in determining whether such a tool can be developed, due to (1) the broad scope of the data covered, especially in her treatment of the development of the human mind and (2) her contention that the meaning of symbols and what they can symbolize depends on structure.;We conclude that a sheerly structural identification of religion and a structural understanding of religious development based on such structures as Langer uses is not possible. However, Langer's work affords some positive suggestions which lead us to be able to understand concepts--including religious concepts--as falling into three conceptual groupings (abstract concepts, concepts, and archetypal concepts) based on their degree of abstraction from the imaginal background of mind.;In analyzing Langer's theories of (1) the division of signs from symbols and of symbols into various types based on structural considerations, (2) the development of the human mind through its physiological and cultural structures, and (3) the development of religion as a cultural artifact and as a part of the development of mind, we find that her work does not allow either a structural identification of religion or an understanding of religious development as primarily structural. Langer's work is fraught with inconsistency and conclusions from scanty evidence. A relativistic metaphysical basis to her work appears to make questionable the positive assertions she does make. |
