THE BOUNDS OF PHENOMENOLOGY: AN ESSAY ON HUSSERL AND HEGEL

Although the literature on, and the interest in, the relation of Husserlian phenomenology and Hegelian phenomenology (as expressed in the Phenomenology of Spirit--PhS) are almost next to nil, the interpretations surrounding this relation are plagued by a number of aporiai. (1) There is too much attention to extraneous matters. (2) There is no adequate attempt to work out and explicate their respective theories of phenomenology and the coherency of the theories. (3) There is a failure to spell out the presuppositions involved in the formation of transcendental philosophy which is to be established within their respective phenomenological frameworks. Our approach avoids these pitfalls by focusing on Husserl's phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy within a subjectively dependent framework, and on Hegel's phenomenology as a propadeutic to a concept dependent framework. As a propadeutic, however, Hegelian phenomenology is an immanent critique of philosophical discourse, which is articulated within a subjectively dependent framework, in order for the concept dependent framework to be instituted. The question is raised as to whether Husserlian phenomenology can be encompassed by the immanent critique of the PhS. This would mean that Husserl's phenomenology must be prefigured by a cognitive formation in the PhS. We answer this question in the affirmative. We give individual treatment to Husserl and Hegel concerning the relation of phenomenology to logic. We go into a detailed analysis of what is involved in Husserl's notion of the subjective-logical and its aesthetic orientation, where we develop Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and its relation to world. We show that Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and world is prefigured by and maintains a family resemblance to the cognitive formation "Religion." We demonstrate finally that the argument of "Absolute Knowing" provides for the elimination of the subjective dependent framework as a viable principle for philosophical discourse. With this result, it becomes possible to claim that Hegel's PhS has encompassed and, hence, negated the subjectively dependent phenomenology of Husserl.