Homicide defendants' paths through the Tennessee criminal justice system: The impact of prosecutorial discretion as a social justice issu

The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not Tennessee prosecution of capital defendants is legally and therefore socially just, as determined by constitutional standards. The conceptual framework included the following aspects: (1) A decision tree was constructed representing the critical stages of the prosecutorial process and the possible outcomes at each juncture of the decision-making process. (2) Given the possible outcomes at each juncture, the probabilities of capital cases being disposed of at a given level of disposition were determined. (3) Finally, there was a determination of the effects of race, gender, economic status, criminal history and locale on the probable outcomes.;The criteria for interpretation were based on the standards of arbitrariness, discrimination and cruel and inhumane treatment as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia (1972).;The defendants from three hundred firearm-homicide incidents in East Tennessee individually were traced through the criminal justice system from homicide event, through the prosecutorial process, to ultimate retribution by the state. An analysis of the results indicated systematic whim and caprice and a lack of equal protection of law for those of differing race, gender, economic status and jurisdiction. However, race was not the overriding factor, as previous studies have held, nor was any of the research variables more important than any other in determining outcome. Rather, there appeared to be a combination of legal and extralegal factors that, depending on the level of case disposition, combined to form a systematic bias, the key factor of which was unbridled prosecutorial discretion. The decision-making suggested bureaucratic pragmatism and local concepts of social justice rather than adherence to law.;The Tennessee Supreme Court had no substantial basis for its findings that the death penalty was imposed by the state without arbitrariness or disparate impact or inhumanity, as Rule 12 safeguards were all but absent. As a result, the court's claim of strict, routine review of all the cases could not be considered valid. Indeed, the death penalty was imposed so infrequently, even for the most heinous crimes, as to be cruel and inhumane per se, according to Furman standards.;It was concluded that the imposition of the death penalty in East Tennessee, from 1977-1987, was unconstitutional and therefore legally and socially unjust.